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In traditional economics, the patent systenl has rested on a 
twofold justification: 1) The award of a temporary monopoly to the 
creator of an invention will indt:ce investment in inventive activity; 
2) Given such a temporary monopoly, the inventor will make his 
invention public knowledge. Numerous write:rs have treated the first 
assertion, and a few have considered the second. But there is also 
a general welfare question to be considered: Is society better off 
with a patent system than without one ? 
This basic question ramifies into any assessment of federal 
patent policy. First, patent policy can affect the rate and 
direction of technological innovation. Second, it can play a major 
role in determining the control within the private sector over the 
process and exploitation of innovations. A few writers have addressed 
the general welfare question in patents. Moreover, the arguments 
and analyses advanced by these writers have found expression in the 
public arena, particularly since World War II, when the federal 
government entered the area of research and development contracting 
in a massive fashion. 
Clearly, answers to the general welfare question turn on what 
the actual effects of the patent system are compared to a world in which 
no such system exists. There are two fairly good literature reviews 
which surrunarize the arguments of the neoclassicists on these points.
1 
J. B. Clark argued in his Essentials of Economic Theory that without 
a patent system there would be very little inventive activity. 11 If an 
invention became public property the moment that it was made, there 
would be small profit accruing to anyone from the use of it and smaller 
ones from making it . . . . The system which gave a man no control 
over the use of his inventions would result in a rivalry in waiting for 
others rather than an effo.rt to distan<.e others in originating improve-
2 
ments. 11 Frank Taussig and A. C. Pigou seem to argue that the total of 
inventive activity is not much increased by the grant of monopoly power 
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but that the allocation of such effort is so affected. Pigou says: 
"By offering the prospect of reward for certain types of invention 
they do not, indeed, appreciably st:hnulate inventive activity, 
which is for the most part, spontaneous, but they do direct it into 
3 channels of general usefulness. n 
Pigou's statement points to the fact that, whatever effects 
the patent system may or may not have in increasing the level of 
inventive activity, it is also likely to bias the mix of what activity 
is undertaken. The patent la·w of the United States provides, for 
example, that inventions may be patented while "discoveries" of 
scientific laws may not. AlsQ, there is an elaborate and changing 
corpus of rules and laws which permit certain kinds of inventions 
to receive patents while others may not. As far as we can tell, 
there seems to be no particular reason to believe that whatever 
li.as is introduced in the direction of patentable inventions is 
advantageous or disadvantageous from a general welfare point of 
view, 
Other neoclassical economists, such as A. Marshall, argued that 
the patent system favors large corporations at the expense of small 
firms. J. M. Clark argued that firms with monopoly power will 
use the patent system to secure that power by engaging in patent 
suppression. Others have argued that while the patent system does 
induce inventive activity, it induces too much of the wrong sort. By 
protecting the original inventor, if he is successful in marketing 
his mousetrap, other firms will have an incentive to 11invent around11 
his patent in an effort to secure a share of the monopoly profits. 
The original inventor (or the firm that he licenses) will also have 
an incentive to invent around the patent for defensive purposes. 
A. Plant argues that the encoL1ragement of innovation by the patent 
system leads to 1'too much" teclmical change of the wrong kind. 4 
Some of these economic argwnents found expression in the 
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political arena during World War II, when it was charged that patent 
abuses were responsible for acute shortages of such strategic 
materials as beryllimn, magnesium, optical glass, and chemicals. 
To reconstruct the assumptions and argwnents of the critics, various 
big business corporations possessed patents for ways to create and 
manufacture substitute materials but had left these patents unexploited. 
In part, it was because they had entered agreements with foreign, 
including German, cartels which prohibited them from developing cer­
tain types of processes in the United States. In part, it was also 
because they tended to protect their own economic position, so the 
argument ran, by blocking other producers, especially technologically 
innovative small businessmen, from entering the market. They bought 
up, then suppressed potehtially competitive inventions or tied them up 
in costly patent infringement suits. According to the widely publicized 
final report of the Temporary National Economic Cornrnittee, 1941, big 
business corporations used the patent system 11to control whole indus­
tries, to suppress competition, to restrict output, to enhance prices, 
5 
to suppress inventions, and to discourage inventiveness." 
The patent issue was amply dramatized in the rubber crisis of 
1942. Once the Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia had cut off the
supply of natural rubber, the nation's stockpiles diminished so rapidly 
that the President called upon the public to turn in old tires, garden 
hoses, bathing caps, and raincoats. 1Why had no synthetic rubber 
industry been developed in anticipation of the need ?'1 critics asked. A 
blue-ribbon Presidential cornrnittee headed by Bernard Baruch 
attributed the situation to a complicated mixture of human, bureaucra­
tic and technical failures. Thurman Arnold, the admiri stration1s 
chief trustbuster and a member of the Temporary National Economic 
Committee, found a quite different answer, which he detailed in a 
20, 000 word antitrust complaint. The complaint charged the existence 
of sinister agreements between the German chemical cartel I. G. Farben 
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and the Standard Oil Company, which held essential synthetic rubber 
patents and had refused to license them to at.lier U.S. manufacturers. 
The Justice Department dropped the charges for the duration in the 
interests of the war effort, but not before Standard agreed in a con­
sent decree to make available its synthetic rubber patents on a 
6 
royalty-free basis. 
H, as several of the older economic theorists believe, the 
patent system does induce inventive activity, the historical record 
suggests that it may also retard the introduction of certain 
innovations. In addition, one may find in both the literature a.nd 
the historical record conside:rable controversy over whether or not 
grants of patent monopoly tend to encourage a trend toward monopo­
lization in the economy. The older economists seem to split on this 
question as well, Some, such as J. B. Clark, claim. that by giving 
som
.
e monopoly power to a new entrant he is able to secure a foothold 
in a previously monopolized r.narket. Others (Lionel Robbins, Arthur 
Burns, F. A. IIayek} see the patent systerri being used to carteliz,e 
previously competitive markets through pooling agreements and the 
like. 
During World War II, the enormous increase in federal R&D 
expenditures threw a spotlight on the relationship between patent 
policy and industrial concentration. In the late Thirties about two­
thirds of all industrial research workers were employed in fewer 
than ten percent of all industrial laboratories, and the war was doing 
nothing to change this degree of concentration. To the Army, Navy, 
and Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), it seemed 
the wisest course to rely upon the best-staffed and best-equipped 
technical organizations. Tog.ether, by 1944, these three agencies had 
awarded industrial laboratories research and development contracts 
amounting to some $900, 000, 000, which equalled almost half the 
federal governnl.ent' s total wartime investnient for the purpose outside 
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of atomic energy. Some 66o/n of these industrial contracts went to 
only 68 corporations, some 40o/o to only 10, More than nine out of 
ten of these contracts followed a policy that granted title and all 
commercial rights to the contractors.
7 
Though the government 
would receive a royalty-free license for governmental purposes, 
it seemed that the distribution of warthne R&D contracts would 
vest considerable postwar com.rnercial control of defense-related 
patents in a relatively small number of corporations. In any case, 
a nwnber of critics asked, since the government paid for the 
wartime R&:D , should it not as a matter of equity and as agent of 
the public own the fruits of the research? 
Whatever the answer to the question of equity, there has 
been a good deal of argument in the scholarly literature concerning 
the relationship of patent and antitrust policies. Patent and anti­
trust laws are generally viewed to be in diametric opposition. 
Patent laws promote monopoly while antitrust laws promote 
competition. However, while the mechanisms available under the 
laws are antithetical, the intent of both sets of laws is the same - -
to promote the welfare of society. Ward Bowman argues that within the 
8 
intent of the laws, no divergence exists. As several surveys in 
addition to Bowrnan1s examine this complex controversy in consider-
9 
able detail, we shall not attempt to address the issue here. 
What we will attempt to do is this: First, since there is so 
much disagreement over the welfare effects of a patent system, we 
will examine some simple but explicit models to see what features 
of the patent system the early writers may have seized on that lead 
them to such diverse conclusions. Second, we will draw upon this 
discussion to suggest how the patent systeni. might be manipulated to 
improve the welfare output. Third, we will consider one of the main 
manipulative possibilities to have received attention - - the so-called title 
versus license policy - - and assess the literature in this area. Fourth 
and finally, we will draw some conclusions about the general problem, 
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including certain suggestions about the political realities of patent 
policy and policy strategies. 
I. A SURVEY OE' MODELS 
The principal allocative fe.atures of inv�ntive activity are 
these: First, the generation of knowledge entails significant external 
effects. Second, exclusion or appropriability is limited. And third, 
the inventor confronts both technical and market uncertainty, while 
institutional arrangements do not permit him fully to shift risk to 
the degree that he might like. These three features are ably 
discussed in Arrow1 s essay and according to him (and others) each 
of these factors tends to induce underinvestment in inventive activity.
10 
As might be expected this conclusion, though widely shared, is by no 
means uncontested. Indeed, some economists have argued that there 
11 
is some reason to suspect overinvestment in inventive activity. 
The argument that there will otherwise be too little invenf:ive 
activity is the major economic justification of the patent system. The 
basic assertion is that by inc:reasing the ability of an inventor to 
appropriate the rewards of his invention (i.e., by narrowing the gap 
between the social and private reward from his activity) more inven­
tion will take place. Evidently this justification would fail either if 
the argwnent of inadequate inventive activity were undermined or if 
the claim that p2.tents induce invention were shown to be false. V{ e 
shall therefore concentrate here on casting about doubt as liberally 
as possible, erring more frequently on the side of skepticism than 
o f  fa i t h. We shall deal with the three issues of appropriability, 
externality, and uncertainty and the effect of the patent system on each, 
A. Appropriability 
Does a patent system have the effect of increasing the ability of 
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an inventor .to appropriate the rewards of his invention? Both empirical 
and theoretical work o:n innovation under rivalry is based on the recogni­
tion that, generally, in the absence of patent considerations there is a 
certain amount of 11natural appropriability11 in innovations� Once a firm 
introduces a new product or cost reducing process it enjoys monopoly 
power for a certain period before it is imitated. Empirical studies by 
Mansfield of how long it took firms to adopt innovations in the railroad, 
bituminous coal, iron and steel, and brewing industries indicate that 
imitation often is quite a slow process. Moreover, the forces affecting 
imitation seem to vary by industry and by invention. 12 There is evidence 
in these studies that imitation is such a slow process that introduction of 
patent rights may have had negligible effects. 
Theoretical studies by Kamien and Schwartz
13
, 
14 . 15 Barzel , Scherer , 
and others have focused on innovative activity in various kinds of economic 
environments without a patent system, Each of the models is unique in 
major respects and consequently they generate somewhat different 
conclusions. Barze!, using a rather loosely defined concept of rivalry, 
argues that increased rivalry leads to premature innovation, Scherer1s 
game theoretic models produce more qualified results which depend on 
several factors. For example, in considering Nash equilibria for a duopoly, 
Scherer finds that,. if the length of time the imitator waits before imitating 
does not affect the share of the market it can obtain, then the innovator 
will not change his introduction time in response to changes in schedule 
by the imitator. Additionally (still assuming Cournot-Nash behavior) 
Scherer finds that the greater the number of firms the stronger incentive 
firm i. has to conduct its development rapidly, and so forth. 16 
Using another concept of rivalry, Kamien and Schwartz reach 
quite different conclusions, They find that increased rivalry delays 
innovation. In their models firms characterize their environment by a 
probability distribution over rival introduction times. As in the other 
models there is technical and market certainty. The general result is 
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that as the probability that a rival innovates first increases, innovations 
that would have been introdu:ced 11soon° by the firm are introduced sooner. 
On the other hand for those innovations that would have been int:roduced 
later, increased probability of rival introduction tends to retard 
innovative activity by the firm. Finally as the probability of rapid 
imitation increases, the firrn tends to delay innovation, 
The introduction of a patent system has the effect of inhibiting 
or preventing imitation. Consequently the fear of rapid im.itation need 
not enter into the firm1s calculation to as great an extent with a patent 
system as without one. For this reason, some believe that to varying 
degrees, the patent system increases appropriability for the innovator 
by partly removing the ability of imitators to sap away quasirents 
accru:ing to an innovator. 
Before accepting this conclusion, however, several other factors 
must be taken into consideration, In order to obtain a patent, the fine 
details of the invention must be publicly disclosed. Possibly competitors 
will utilize the disclosed information to 11invent around11 the patent and 
offer a sirnilar product at a lower investment cost, While it is true that 
the patent system in part counterbalances the advantage of disclosure to 
the competitor by increasing the engineering and legal problems for the 
imitator {and therefore his costs), it is also true that enforcement of 
patent grant from infr:ingers is not costless to the holder. A sirnilar 
reciprocity of increased costs exists if the innovator patents near­
substitutes defensively. 17 w·hile such action increases the costs greatly 
to imitators, it is not costless to the innovator and may in fact exceed 
many times the R&D costs of original i.nvention. 
Innovators must take into account that patent longevity is fixed 
18 
in the present system at 17 years. For most inventions, a patent grant 
for this length of time is excessive since innovators would be willing to 
accept a patent of shorter duration for the benefit of nondisclosure. In 
this case, society could be n1ade better off by shortening the duration of 
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the grant up to the point where the inventor is just willing to disclose. 
Of course, there is one problem in constructing an institution to 
determine this point. After all, the innovator has no incentive to 
state the shortest duration necessary for him to disclose, and if an 
outside party must do this determination, the invention must be first 
disclosed to the party. The result is similar to Catch-22. 
We must also recognize that inventions may develop for which 
the 17 year monopoly grant is not sufficient to induce disclosure. In 
such cases, it may be socially desirable to extend the length of the 
grant. Of course, the same problems exist in this situation as in the 
case where the grant was of too long a duration. 
Another factor to be considered before adopting any conclusion 
on the effects of a patent system on appropriability is the non-economic 
institutional environment in particular, the attitude of the patent office 
and the courts. Some authors have suggested that there has been a 
tendency for standards of patentability to rise through tim.e, for only 
speciiic (rather than general} patents to be granted, and for an increas­
ing number of challenged patents to be struck down. We have also 
asswned the candidate firm to perform the R&D as a rational actor 
when in fact it is an organization made up of divisions 0£ labor, two of 
these being management and research. Some authors have argued 
that the major incentives stemming from appropriability should be 
directed toward the individuals in the research division rather than 
19 management. 
The considerations in this section indicate first of all that there 
are many different kinds of possible patent systems; second, the amount 
of appropriability guaranteed by any of them varies; and third, because 
of the possibility of litigation, whatever appropriability is obtaine� is 
not without costs. In view of these observations, it is somewhat dubious 
that whatever actual system of patent right is in force significantly 
increases the ability of an inventor to capture the rewards of his idea. 
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B. Externality 
Some authors seem to view research and development activity 
as consisting of the production of inventions which may be put to 
specific uses in reducing the costs of particular production processes, 
or (in the case of new products) in satisfying consumer desires; but 
others take the view that research and development is the production 
of information. 
2 O 
For these latter authors, an invention allows each person to 
reformulate his expectations about what the true state of the world is 
and, to the extent that, his revised beliefs affect his allocative 
decisions profit from this information. Of course, i£ the information 
content of an invention is profitable (in the above sense) to only one 
person or firm, then there is no externality problem. Indeed, the 
theoretical and empirical sb1dies which suggest the importance of 
natural appropriability and, consequently, barriers to diffusion may 
be recast to argue exactly this point, As it is however, few economists 
have addressed this particular feature of inventive activity and so the 
connnents we make here are largely ungrounded in the existing 
literature. 21 
Many economists seem to accept this much: The introduction 
of patent rights may well inc.rease the allocation of resources to 
inventive activity; in the absence of such rights, such activity may 
well suffer from underinvestment. To the extent that the introdi.1ction 
of a patent system discourages these conditions, it is beneficial. 
However, much in this state;ment warrants examination. In particular, 
we may note that some inventions would seem to convey a lot of valuable 
information to many firms, while other inventions are valuable to only 
a few. What, then, is the effect of patent rights in the allocation of 
resources as between these two types of invention ?22 Many analysts 
have stressed the importance of this question -- and also the fact that 
it remains largely unanswered. 
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From the point of view of the production of infor1nation, the 
definition of patentability is a critical determinant of how well any 
patent system encourages investment in innovation. The patent 
system in the United States �oes not permit patenting of basic 
scientific ideas while, on the other hand, can openers are fair game. 
To some extent such a system would seem to encourage investment 
in can openers at the expense of basic science. It has been suggested 
that one precondition to patentability be 11usefulness. 112 3 Many of the 
decisions of early court cases seem to be of this persuasion. 24 
Nonetheless, in most recent courts, the trend is to favor patents only 
for specific increments of hard teclmology. 25 In the presence of such 
unexamined allocative phenomena it is hard to conclude that patent 
rights encourage the production of the sort of i.nf'ormation that is 
valuable to many agents in the economy. 26 
Finally, as Arrow argued, the institution of patent rights allows 
a patent holder to charge a price for the use of information which is in 
excess of the cost of transmitting the information. Patent rights 
therefore inhibit the utilization of the existing stock of knowledge as 
well as altering the allocation of resources to various kinds of research 
and development. 
C. Uncertainty 
The literature on the economics of invention focuses on two 
major kinds of uncertainty which face the inventor. First there is 
technical uncertainty: The inventor does not know in advance what 
output he will be able to obtain from a given combination of inputs. 
Secondly, he faces market uncertainty: If he succeeds in producing 
(let's say) a new commodity at a particular unit cost, he does not know 
what the demand for it will be. Obviously there is a certain interdepen· 
dence between these concepts but the distinction seems intuitive enough 
and certainly economists interested in resource allocation have tended 
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to analyze these hvo kinds of uncertainty separately. In any case, 
given the presence of these kinds of uncertainty, 2.nd the absenc�� 
of the full range of risk-shifting institutions required for the 
achievement o:f efficient equilibria, risk-aversion on the part of 
inventors and financiers will tend to inhibit inventive effort. 
This simple conclusion has provoked objections from sonie 
economists. As A. Phillips has pointed out "While there are risks 
associated with investment ill research and innovation, failure on 
the part of the individual firrn to undertake these risks entails the 
more substantial risk that all�other will succeed. il-7 How signifi-
cant this third form of uncertainty is as against the former two 
depends on several factors. First if the invention in question is 
difficult to duplicate or utilize (i.e., if it has natural appropriab:Uity), 
the original innovator may enjoy a relatively long period of obtai:ning 
monopoly rents while those f'i.rms which failed to innovate may suffer 
serious losses in sales revenues and market shares, Secondly 
market characteristics may �be such that the longer it takes firms to 
copy an innovator, the less able they will be to obtain a given share 
28 
of the market. 
On the other hand Baldwin and Childs have argued that in 
some circumstances large fi:rms may find that their best strategy 
with respect to research and development is what they call the "fast 
29 
second. 11 That is, such fi:rms should not try to engage in creating 
new inventions but rather spe�cialize in "reverse engineering. n When 
a smaller firm introduces an innovation the large firm obtains 
valuable information which enables it to reduce both technical and 
market uncertainty. It can then engage in imitative activity, and once 
having achieved a successful copy of the original innovation, utilize 
its superior marketing organization to retain its dominant position in 
the industry. In the light of this work by Baldwin and Childs it is 
difficult to conclude. comfortably that the risk 0£ someone else1s being 
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first will necessarily induce innovation. 
The presence of a patent system is bound to affect the third 
type of uncertainty, i.e., the risk that another firm will innovate 
first. After all, it would appear that by inhibiting imitation the 
patent system would increase the costs to firms of not innovating, 
To some degree, the fast-second strategy would seem to be made 
less attractive. However, we do not have 'sufficient empirical work 
to be confident of this conclusion, and at least one empirical study, 
by Comanor, contradicts it. In some industries (and in certain 
courts) it is very difficult to establish patent infringement, so it 
is relatively easy for imitators to produce near copies of an inven­
tion. Comanor1 s study of the pharmaceutical industry suggests that 
even with patent protection, patents are so specific that 11, • •  it is 
frequently possible to invent around existing patents; to find a 
variant which has not been specified, obtain a patent for it, and 
. 30 introduce it as a competing product,,, Indeed, Comanor presents 
data which show that, in the aggregate, new products account for 
the largest proportion of sales in the second year after this introduc­
tion. If the patent system discourages the fast-second strategy at 
all, it would thus seem to do so by lengthening what would otherwise 
be an extremely short period of natural appropriability to around two 
years. Comanor also notes that a substantial portion of the research 
that goes on in the industry is essentially imitative. It seems there­
fore that the introduction of patent rights raises the costs of imitation 
but at least in certain industries not so much as to rule out the fast-
second strategy. 
By allowing the inventor to capture monopoly profits, the 
patent system would on net increase the allocation of resources to 
innovative activity and, hence, ffiake less serious the underinvestment 
resulting from technical and market uncertainty. Or so one might 
thinlt. But the presence of patent rights means that the firm which 
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-comes in. second with an invention gets nothing at all. Thus we can 
see that a patent system int:roduces a fourth source of uncertaL'1ty 
into the calculus of invention: In the presence of an inviolable 
patent the penalty for being second is increased. It is not at all 
clear that the increased payoff for being first outweighs the smaller 
one for being second. J.n fact, we have given conditions elsev;·here 
under which the introduction of a patent system inhibits innovation 
31 
where the firm is risk-neutral. Evidently stronger conditions 
could be found if the firm acted in a risk-averse fashion. 
However, patents are not necessarily inviolable, As dis­
cussed in the section on appropriability, patents may be infringed 
upon or invented around. This introduces a fifth kind of uncertainty 
associated with any patented invention: The costs of defending it 
and_ the costs of circUlUVenting it. One may i.m.agine situations 
where, depending on the attitude of the courts, the cost of attacking 
a patent to have it overthrown is less than the research costs. This 
would tend to inhibit inventions of greater value than the cost of 
circumventing them. Again, the effect on this type of uncertainty 
on innovative behavior all depends on the relative n&ture of the two 
costs and the value of the invention. 
Finally, we must note the argument that in the presence of 
uncertainty, we cannot be s'l,'l:re that there is too little inventiv� activity. 
Hirshleifer, in a recent paper, suggests that an inventor by virtue 
of having produced a cotton gin, a new type of automobile engine, or 
a cheaper process for making steel has valuable information as to what 
the true state of the world is, He can utilize this information to make 
bets through (for example) commodities markets. The amount of 
speculative return he can obtain through his informational advantage 
would seem to be limited mainly by his ability to borrow money and 
his caution that extraneous factors may upset his prediction. In the 
absence of the opportunity to insure against other factors the inventor 
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may be inhibited in his speculation. In any event, the presence of 
such opportunities indicates that we cannot be sure that the inventor 
will be undercompensated in the absence of patent protection. 32 
Since, as Hirschleifer says, there is no necessary relation between 
the technical Unportance of an innovation and the amount of 
speculative gain an inventor can obtain, there may be a tendency for 
too much invention to take place as inventors seek the basis for 
speculative profits, Hirschleifer remarks that 11even though practical 
considerations limit the effective scale and consequent impact of 
speculation and/or resale, the gains thus achievable eliminate any a 
priori anticipation of underinvestment in the generation of new 
. 33 technolog1cal knowledge. 11 
In all, it seems that the literature on the patent system gives 
us little reason to believe that on balance the introduction of patent 
rights v::ill increase the level of inventive activity in the economy. 
Although we might be sure that inventors are more able to appropriate 
the rewards for their inventions than they would be without such a 
system, this effect may be offset by other changes. For example, if 
the effect of increased appropriability is to increase innovative 
activity by a firn1, then it seems likely that its rivals will increase 
their activity as well. But at least some of the literature we have on 
rivalry suggests that increased rivalry inhibits innovation. Additionally, 
we have seen that patent rights introduce an additional source of risk 
into research and development decision-1naking. 
Secondly, even if we were sure that patents stimulate invention, 
such stimulation may introduce a serious bias into inventive activity, 
Inventive activity is shifted under patent rights from what it would have 
been without them. We simply need more information before any 
conclusions can be drav;rn on such effects. 
Thirdly, there is still some question as to whether we are 
entitled to conclude that in the absence of a patent system there will be 
too little investment in innovation. Hirschleifer' s novel argument should 
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cause us to look more closely into the basis of such assertions. One 
suspects that no si.m.ple conclusion of thjs sort will in the end meri.t 
support. Variation by industry, type of innovation, differential access 
of firms and individuals to capital rn.arkets, and other phenomena seem 
likely to affect the outcome of such an investigation. 
Fourth, while we have 'llsed the phrase 11patent system'1 repeatedly 
in this essay, this system is no single unchanging "thing." Within the 
United States it has varied over time, by industry, and by court of 
appeals. The presence of such variation should encourage scholars to 
compare the impact of one sorl: of patent system with that of another. 
Indeed economists who have examined the question of optimal patent 
life have made some strides in this direction. 
Fifth, while generations of economists have indicated that the 
allocation of resources to inventive activity is unlikely to satisfy Pareto 
efficiency and while some of the same scholars have indicated that a 
patent system is also unlikely to be efficient, we do not find that much 
effort has been spent in the search for second best institutional structures. 
Perhaps it is because the models so far developed in this area are not yet 
well developed, or because there is general disagreen1ent over what 
constitute the phenomena of most interest. Still it is discouraging that 
the state of the art in this area is unable to support any hard recommen­
dations for institutional change,, 
II. MANIPULATIONS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 
Given the existence of a patent system, and given the lack of 
second�best institutional alternatives, public policy analysis is left with 
only one option: To inquire into possible ways to manipulate the 
patent system so as to increase social welfare. Article I. section 8, 
of the Constitution provides CorLgress with the power 11to promote the 
progress of science and useftil arts, by securing for limited times to 
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authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writing 
and discoveries"; it is this clause which permits Congress to make 
provisions for patents. The clause does not, however, specify the 
exact nature of the patent. As we have seen, the specific nature of 
the grant may have a great deal of an effect on the direction and 
rate of inventive activity. 
We wish here to delineate several variations over which a 
patent grant may be constructed within the constitutional mandate. 
For our purposes, we need not distinguish congressional changes 
in statute from executive changes in administrative law. Moreover, 
for policy considerations we regard it as necessary to consider the 
patent syste1n both as an institution in itself and as an institution in 
an environment of other institutions (e.g. antitrust system). 
A. General Considerations 
Generally, we must consider four aspects of a patent grant: 
l} the specific property rights of the grant, 2) the nature of invention 
required for a grant to be awarded, 3) procurement of the grant and, 
4) the enforcement of the grant. The p:operty rights of the patent 
grant may be further broken down into exclusivity rights and trans -
ferability rights. The exclusivity rights of the patent grant operate in 
three dimensions: inventions, per sons, and time. The exclusivity r'ights 
place restrictions on the employment (manufacture, sale, and use) of certain 
inventLons by certain persons during <:.bpecified time. In the present system, 
all but few persons without license from the holder of a patent grant are· restricted 
from employing inventions which are "similar" to the patented invention 
for 17 years after the assignment of the rights?
4 
In some other system, 
patents could be offered which did not restrict employment of the 
invention without license by nonprofit organizations or firms engaged 
in health research. Exclusivity rights could also be limited to geogra-
phical region. One of the more common suggestions for change of the 
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present system is the length of patent duration. Perhaps inventions 
could be assessed for value and patent duration be an increasing 
function of value (but see p. --t� for difficulties in implirn.enting the 
assessment). Transferability restrictions may be placed on the 
grant. Such restrictions could serve to lower the value of the grant 
and so in some way redirect inventive activity or wealth distribution. 
The nature of invention required for a patent to be awarded 
hinges on the definition of patentability and the existence of previously 
awarded exclusivity rights. As noted earlier in this paper, to the 
extent that the property rights associated with the patent grant are 
valuable, the requirement for patentability is a factor in determining 
the direction of inventive activity. To allow patents for can openers 
but not computer software packages may bias innovation in favor of 
new can openers. The restrictilon of previously awarded exclusivity 
rights may have a similar effect on the rate of inventive behavior by 
inhibition or encouraging the quality of work in attempts to invent 
around existing patented inventions. 
The procurement requirement of a patent grant may have 
separable effects on wealth distribution. The grants, for example, 
could be 11sold'1 by the government to help defray the costs of operating 
the patent system, increasing the federal R&D budget, or simply as 
an unrestricted addition to general revenues. The ,.price" could be 
a fixed fee at the time of issuance of the grant, the highest bid at an 
open auction or a percentage on the monopoly rents through the life 
of the patent. Again, the "price'1 could be adjusted depending on the 
status of the applicant (individual, university, for-profit firm, etc.). 
Another requirement for procurement could be that the invention be 
commercialized with a certain period of time after the grant or the 
grant would be sugject to revoca.ti.on. This might effect, for exan1ple, 
the extent of defensive patenting. 
Provisions for enforecrnent of the grant may be shouldered by 
the government, left entirely to the holder of the grant, or some coinbinati.on. 
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Inf ringers on the exclusivity rights much be both located and prose­
cutedo Again, effects on inventive activity and wealth distribution 
are suggestive. If all costs of enforcement were to be carried by 
the grant holders, enforcement by small inventors would probably 
be difficult. Depending on the costs of transferability of the grant 
(along with the associated problem of negotiating a sale price without 
actually disclosing the invention), such an enforcement mechanism 
might eliminate small inventors. 
A patent system could be constructed by combining these 
provisions in various fashions. One patent system might have many 
different kinds of patent types. Tradeoffs could be made among the 
four aspects; the combinations are virtually endless. One could 
even conceive of a system in which each patent application is 
individually negotiated to determine the nature of the grant. Of
cour.se, we must be cognizant of the costs associated with each patent 
system. All systems require the transfer of some information. 
Recall especially the difficulties associated with the disclosure of an 
invention without property rights in order to valuate it, The welfare 
benefits to be gained by allowing a flexible institution may after some 
degree be lost or even swamped because of losses associated with 
institutionally induced information fraud or strategy uncertainties. 
J.n constructing a patent system, consideration should also be 
given to other legal institutions with incident jurisdictions. Such con­
sideration might include patent recognition agreements in international 
policy, compulsory di.sclosure 0£ certain inventions or licensing of 
patents for purposes of national security {for example, in the nuclear 
energy field) or the regulation of other industries (e.g., health, 
environment), special tax status on patent holdings, the legal standing 
of trade secrets, and limitations of soveriegn immunity from patent 
infringement actions, While all of these areas are discussed in the 
literature, two others receiving considerable attention are antitrust 
and federal contractor policies. 
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While the intent of bi::.ith patent and antitrust policies may be 
to further the public interest, the tools available to each system 
are inherently at odds. ThE� effect of the patent system is to create 
monopolies while the effect of .the antitrust system is reduce 
anticompetitive behavior. The basic considerations made in this 
area will be on the acquisition of patent rights. Limitations may 
be imposed on the legality of employer-employee contracts which 
assign the inventions of employees, and the general acquisition of 
patent rights from a third party for the purposes of monopolizing 
a process or technique or regimenting an industry. Limitations 
may also be imposed on the legality of special licensing such as 
package licensing and tie-ins (licenses will be granted only if the 
licensee accepts and pays royalties for a 11package11 of licenses); 
grant-back licensing (require licensees to 11grant-back'1 rights to 
the licensor any improvements developed and patented by the 
licensee); patent pooling, territorial restrictions, quota restrictions 
in production, or price fixing. Conversely, instead of limitations 
on the legality of these acquisitions or license restrictions, special 
sanction exempting them from antitrust proceedings could be 
incorporated into the patent system. One might argue, for exarnple, 
that grant-back licensing or patent pooling does not have a substan­
tial effort on inhibiting inventive behavior on the part of the licensee 
and does allow freer competition. 
B. Patents and Federal R&D Contracts 
Still another opportunity for manipulating the patent system 
occurs in the disposition of patent rights for inventions deriving from 
federally sponsored research and development. Before World War II 
the government followed a nonuniform policy for vesting such rights. 
TVA and the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior pursued a 
11title" policy, n1.eaning that they claimed title to all patents emerging 
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from rest:oarch which they financed, In contrast, the Army and Navy 
followed a "license'' policy, meaning that they generally allowed 
their industrial contractors to retain title to such patents, subject 
to the provision that the government would receive a royalty-free 
license to use them for any governmental purpose. Prior to the war 
these divergent practices within the government seem to have pro­
voked little if any controversy, but during the war and, indeed, since 
1945, the issue of title versus license has absorbed a good deal of 
political energy. It has also occupied considerable space in the 
literature, perhaps more than any subject other than patents and 
antitrust policy. 
Both the political and scholarly attention seem to have been 
merited, Federal contracts have become the main source of invest-
ment in R&D since 1945, and the patent policy stipulated in them 
can exercise wide-ranging effects over the direction and nature of 
inventive activity in the United States and over the extent of 
concentration and competition in industry. In short, the patent policy 
stipulated in future contracts can determine to a considerable extent 
precisely the welfare output of the patent system that is of interest 
to us. 
During World War II, the political hand in this area was taken 
by Senator Harley M. Kilgore of West Virginia. A freshm.an Senator 
and a Democrat with a strong populist streak, Kilgore was an 
outspoken member of the Truman Committee who became increasingly 
convinced that a good deal was wrong with the technical side of war 
mobilization. By 1943 Kilgore had introduced the Science Mobilization 
Act. Though much of the bill was addressed to the funding and 
administration of R&:D, it included clauses designed to prevent the 
patent system from working against the public interest, especially by 
fostering industrial concentration, Kilgore1s bill proposed to stimulate 
technological innovation, the commercialization of new products and 
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processes, and the entry of small businessmen into markets in part 
by compelling the disclosure and nondiscriminatory dissemination 
of information about important technical processes developed in any, 
including the major, corporate laboratories. To safeguard the 
public interest against industrial concentration, a new federal agency 
was to be granted ownership and be enpowered with the exclusive 
right to use or license 11any invention, discovery, patent, or patent 
right11 which had resulted from research supported with nany money, 
credit, physical facilities, or personnel!! by the federal governm.ent 
35 
since the declaration of national emergency in 1941. 
Kilgore1s bills, especially his patent provi_sions, provoked 
considerable opposition, fro1n trade associations, industrial research 
managers, some leading scientists, and the Army and Navy. The 
critics dissented from giving the government the power to commandeer 
scie?tific and technical data, a power which, in the claim of a scientist 
at General Electric, would essentially force big business to aid small 
business by the disclosure of proprietary technical secrets. Worse, 
according to the way the bil11s patent clauses defined federal aid, an 
industrial corporation would lose all patent rights ir. an invention if, 
while working on a government research project, it merely received 
technical advice from an arrned service officer. Unless industry got 
at least a fair gui.d pro quo for i.ts contribution to governmentally 
sponsored developments, Kilgore1s opponents were sure, there would 
be no incentive for i.ndustry to participate in federal research progran1s, 
To his opposition, Ki1gore1s patent policy seemed wrongheaded 
even in his own terms. Kilgore might want to help small business. 
If small business firms could not count on monopoly rights over 
innovations which they produced under government contract, they 
would be unlikely to risk the investment required for R&D in the first 
place. Kilgore might want to encourage technological innovation. 
Unless firms were guaranteed the commercial rights in patents deriving 
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from federally sponsored research, they would have no incentive to 
participate in the contract. Kilgore might propose to stimulate the 
commercialization of patents. Without the protection of the 
exclusive use of the patent, there would be no incentive to develop 
an invention into a marketable product. 36 
By the end of the war, the lines had been drawn firtnly between 
advocates of title policy on the one hand and of license policy on the 
other. All parties in the issue -- in the bureaucracy, industry, and 
the scientific community -- realized that the stakes were high. 
Federal expenditures for R&D promised to remain at unprecedented 
heights in peacetime; in 1946 the federal government was spending some 
$800, 000, 000 for the purpose. Considering the stakes, the principals 
also realized that the end of the war would mark a turning point in 
this special area of patent policy, and the direction in which the turn 
was.made would seriously affect the nation's economic future. Not 
surprisingly, each side marshalled its political weapons, including 
two major surn:mary documents. 
For the license policy advocates, the document was the collected 
reports of the National Patent Planning Commission. Created by 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt at the end of 1941, largely to investi­
gate the type of abuses spotlighted by the Temporary National Economic 
Committee, the Commission was chaired by Charles F. Kettering, the 
inventor of the self-starter and high-ranking executive in General 
Motors. According to the Commission, it was the judgment of the War 
and Navy Departments that the patent system had not interfered with 
the war effort. Acknowledging that abuses did exist, the Commission 
proposed that all agreements with foreign parties should be published. 
So should domestic agreements that contained restrictions as to markets, 
prices, and production, But, declining to call in the corrective power 
of the federal governrnent, the Commission opposed compulsory 
licensing, arguing that it would--�J�r���Tnaii bUSi�esses· who wOuld have 
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to license their patents to thei:r large competitors, 37 
Turning to the specific question of patents deriving from 
federally sponsored R&D, the Commission assumed that the 
governrnent should not use the patent for purposes of revenue 
control. Accordingly, the Cornmission recommended that the 
govermnent should not ordinarily assert full ownership of patents, 
except where the public health or safety required it. If the 
goverrunent did come to own a patent, the Cornn'lission argued, it 
should make the patent available only on an exclusive basis to firms 
prepared to commercialize the invention. As the Commission 
pointed out, urt often happens . .. , particularly in new fields, 
that what is available for exploitation by everyone is undertaken 
by no one. 11 38
Quite in contrast to the Corrunission1s report was the document 
of the title policy advocates, the massive, authoritative report of the 
U. S. Attorney General on government patent policies and practices. 39 
Completed in 1946, three year:s after President Roosevelt had requested 
it, this three-volume study was addressed specifically to the quesf:ion 
of a uniform policy for patents developed by government employees or 
contractors. The report strongly urged the establishment of a uniform 
policy, to be enforced by a Government Patents Achninistrator. The 
cardinal point of this uniform policy was that all rights to inventio11s 
produced in the performance of a goverrunent contract should be vested 
in the governrnent. 
The report proposed that this right might be waived in two cases: 
first, if the contractor had already made a substantial contribution to 
the state of the art; second, if the contractor's refusal to enter into an 
agreement created an emergency which could be alleviated by perrnitting 
him greater rights. However, the waiver would have to be approved by 
the Goverrunent Patents Administrator. Moreover, no exceptions to the 
uniform patent policy were to be allowed unless a reasonable effort had 
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been made to obtain acceptance by a qualified organization of a title 
policy contract. In any event, the goverrunent was to r e s e rve a 
nonexclusive, royalty-free license to itself. And the contractor 
was to agree to place such inventions in adequate commercial use 
or to license applicant s thereUllder on reasonable terms. 
In a confidential covering memorandum, Attorney General 
Tom Clark emphasized how 1 'unfortunate" it was that the lack of a 
uniform policy during the war had probably cost the public a number 
of patents which should rightfully belong to it. The same mistake 
should not be made during peaceti.rn.e. The President, Clark con­
tinued, could put the recommendations of the report into effect 
forthwith by executive order. But though Clark personally favored 
a title policy, he knew that the armed services as well as the major 
def�nse contracto rs would object vigorously; so would some of the 
Congre s s .  All things considered, Clark advised the President merely 
to publish the report and wait for a more favorable moment to make 
d . bl" i· •0 i t s  recommen at1ons p u  i c  p o  icy, 
The War and Navy Deparb:nents did object - - and vigor.0usly, to say 
the least - - to the title policy proposed i.n the report. Acting Secretary 
of War Kenneth c. Royall argued that adoption would 11wreck" the War 
Deparb:nent' s re search and development programs, which had been 
difficult enough, he said, to place since V - J  Day. Industrial concerns 
were exhibiting extreme reluctance to enter into R&D contracts. 
under current policies. ( Royall d id not specify the source of the 
reluctance, However, it probably came from the government1 s  
insistence upon a royalty -free license on such patents for � govern­
mental purpo se, in the face of the demands of defense contracto r s  that 
such licenses be issued only for the purpo ses of defense . ) Both the 
War and Navy Departments objected to the central administration of 
a uniform patent policy. Both the War and Navy Departments together 
also accounted for 95o/o of all patent applications handled by government 
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agencies and supplied over 95o/o of the federal funds spent for R & D  
contracts. I t  seemed highly anomalous t o  place the rest of the 
goverrunenes departments ort an equal footing with them. 4 1 
To Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, the adoption of a 
uniform title policy would impose a "dangerous rigidity which would 
c e rtainly impede and might altogether imperil the prosecution of a 
vigorous and effective research and development program. " 
Forre stal emphasized that the vesting of rights ought to vary with 
the circumstanc es of the individual contract. As he specified the 
issues, the terms which the government could obtain in a particular 
contract would depend upon 11the presence or absence of con�petition, 
the intensity of any given contractor 1  s desire to obtain the contract, 
the character of research and development work involved, the price 
paid for such work, the likelihood of profitable commercial applica­
tion.s ,  the extent of the particular contractor 1 s  investment in prior 
research and development work in the field, [ and] whether the 
contractor is a non-profit institution.of a commercial concern, l! 42 
In contrast to For restal and Royall. the Secretaries of 
Commerce and Interior as well as the head of the Federal Security 
Agency urged the President to e stablish a title policy. The govern-
ment ought to a s s ert a title policy at least as a matter of right, 
Secretary of the Interior Julius A. Krug argued, and, if necessary, 
permit the various agencies to exercise a certain amount of discretion 
in the administration of the policy with the consent of the General 
Patents Administrator. Kilg ore, who se title policy had passed 
the Senate as part of a bill to c reate a National Science Foundation, had 
wired the President to adopt a title policy by executive order. But 
with OSRD as well a s  the War and Navy Department s objecting so 
vigorously, even J .  Donald Kingsley, a member of the Bureau of the 
Budget who favored a title policy - - it would constitute na far stronger 
weapon against monopoly and indu strial concentration that we now· have"--
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advised that the adJninistration should publish the report for now and 
await a more favorable time to put its recommendations into practice.
43 
Following the colll1sel of his Attorney General and his White House 
staff, President Truman did just that, and the report was published 
in l947. 
But the more favorable moment for the establishment of a 
uniform title policy failed to arrive during both the Truman and the 
Eisenhower administrations. As a result, the vesting of rights in 
patents derived from federally sponsored R&D was left up to the 
determinations of the Congress and the issuance of regulations on an 
agency basis. The choices were clear: title policy, license policy, 
or some combination of the two. All three choices cropped up in 
postwar government policy -- and all three choices may be found in 
the extensive literature on the subject. 
III. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING LITERATURE 
Virtually the entire literature, no matter what the profes sional 
discipline of the author, assesses the merits of strict title or license 
policy in terrns of six issues. One issue is the 1 1 rights 1 1  of the public 
and of industry, the others center on the policy-specific effects of 
the cost to the goverrunent of sponsored research, the rate of 
technological innovation, the dissemination of technological knowledge, 
the potential for invention com:mercialization, and the economic 
concentration in industry. Legal analysts tend to discuss these six 
issues with a methodology which we shall call 11legal theoretic. 1 1  
Economists tend to explore them with what w e  shall call an 1 'economic 
theoretic1'  approach. In addition, there appears in the literature, 
particularly in congres sional hearing s, a third methodolog y  which we 
will call "evidential. 1 1  
Legal theoretic arguments appear in law journals, the patent 
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trade journal, and congres sional hearing s, This type of argument 
generally supports an ethical position on the " rights1 1  of the public 
or of industry, or it attempts to explore the logical implications of 
po stulated economic "facts, 1 1  In terms of fully understanding any 
federal patent policy, two problerns are inherently associated with the 
strictly legal theoretic approach. The first problem is that analysis 
tends to be based on unexamined premises about how the world 
should or does .. vork - - for example, competition does (or does 
not) favor technological innovation. In some cases, these premises
are recognized in their general area of study as quite controversial. 
Many authors fail to note the controve rsies s urrounding one or more 
of the premises utilized in their legal analysis. The unsuspecting 
reader may unwittingly assume that the premises are generally
acc7pted as true. The second premise is more subtle. In order to derive 
useful conclusions from their fundamental premises, it is freql'!.ently neces­
sa;ry for legal theoreticians to add structure to the unstated model, 
For example. as sume the fundamental premise that firms profit­
maxinUze. Because of various interactive effects, in particular the 
elasticities of the supply curve for sponsored research and the demand 
curve for commercialized derivative invention, it i s  not clear what "vill 
be the relative effects of a title over a license policy. However, it may 
be possible to generate some suggestive re sults if we make additional 
a s sumptions about these elasticitie s. The problem arises in legal 
analysis that the additional structure is often not explicitly stated, 
poorly justified or simply inconsistent with other as sumptions. 
Economic theoretic arguments appear in the economic journals 
in addition to the legal theoretic literature. Economic analysis concerns 
itself only margin.ally with the 1 1rights1 1  of the public and of industry and 
concentrates on policy- specific effects of an economic nature. These 
analy s e s  appear to suffer from a general lack of substantive agreement. 
It is probable that this deficiency stems from the absence of a well­
structured general economic theory of patents, as discus s ed earlier
in this paper. 
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Evidential analysis also has no ur1derlying theoretical structure. 
The arguments rest on empirical obser·trations on the operation of 
firms under various patent policies or on statement s of firm manage­
ment Of how they vJould operate if patent policy were changed. The 
problems in eVi.dential analysis are quite clear. Without a theoretical 
s t ructu::-e, operation under a patent policy cannot be related to firm 
structure and industry characteristic s .  It follows that information 
from evidential analysis cannot b e  used for P:redicting chang e s  in firm 
operation under change·s of patent policy. A1anagement officials have 
no incentive t o  reveal honestly, even if �ey know, how they ,vould 
operate if patent policy changed. In the literature, however these 
problems tend to be ignored, particularly when evidential analysis 
is used to support legal theoretic o r  economic theoretic conclusions. 
Issue 1: Consumer and Product 
Who is the consumer and what does he buy in a fede rally 
sponsored R &: D  contract? This is almost exclusively a legal theoretic 
problern. With regard to the distribution of patent rights to inventions 
incidentally developed while under such a contract, the question is 
important for two reasons. First, identification of the consumer 
is necessary to e s tablish who is contending with the contractor for 
the award of the patent grant. Second, the product of the contract 
must b e  examined to determine if any of the parties involved has 
already relinquished his claim to the patent rights in the provisions 
of the contract. 
In federally sponsored r e s earch, the federal government 
itself o r  some agency thereof i s  gene rally regarded a s  one ( u sually 
the o nly) consumer of the research. In particular, the federal 
government i.s a potential contender for the patent rights to inventions 
developed und e r  the contract. However, for the federal goVe r nment 
to be an actual contender for the patent grant, it must first be estab­
lished that the government may indeed retain title to such a grant. 
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At least one author has argued that the retention of a patent grant by 
the federal government is uncons tituti.onal.44 Nonethel e s s ,  it appears 
unlikely that further debate on the dis tribution of patents to inventions 
under federally sponsored research will become mute because of any.reso­
lution of the courts that the government may not hold a patent grant. 
Still, we must answer the question of what the government may do 
with the title to any invention. Re call that gove rnment action with 
the patent grant must be consistent with the cons titutionally required 
incentives of the patent system. 
Shelton argues that the only allowable government action 
which meets these consistency requirements is to grant exclusive 
licenses to private firms.45 The government is not in competition 
in the manufacture, use, or sale of products so the right of exclusion 
granted by the patent is of no use to the government � s e .  Even 
so, . retention by the governme nl!: of the prlncipal rights to an invenHon 
may be a valuable tool in furthering the public interest. The exclu­
sive license need not be irrevocable. The govern.ment could require 
some form of further development o r  commercialization of the 
invention within a fixed period nf time or revoke the license. The 
government has not to date requested royalties for the use of govern­
ment patents. It has been suggested that an additional application in 
the public interest: of govern.men.t owned patents would be a require­
ment o f  reasonable royalties on licenses and use of the s e  fees to 
help (as in the British system) defray the expenses of the general 
4 6 patent system operation. \Vi.thin the literature of the American 
patent system, we cannot find analyses of the effects the requirement 
of royalties would have on the di�mand of licenses (exclusive or 
nonexclusive) to government owned patents by private industry. Even 
if it w e r e  to be shown that a modification of the present grant of 
nonexclusive n.onroyalty licenses to royalty-bearing exclusive or 
nonexclusive licenses better achieved the cons titutional objective 
of the patent system, clearly nolt all royalty schemes would do so. 
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The lack of a purely competitive market for such licenses would 
make selection of an optimal royalty s cheme difficult if not impossible. 
The report of the Attorney G e neral also presents another 
47 
difficulty with the grants of royalty bearing and/or exclusive license s .  
Under these grants, i. t  would b e  necessary t o  police the patent 
rights and b r i ng suits against the infringe r s .  Infringement of 
government ov;,-ned patents' rights are not prese ntly prosecuted. 
Under exclusive l i c e n s e s ,  it may be po s s i ble to have the licensee, 
rather than the federal government, prosecute infringe r s .  But 
this does not alleviate the need of enforcement of the patent rights 
o n  which exclusive licenses have not yet been applied for or granted. 
Under nonexclusive licens e s , pros ecution of infringe r s  b y  licensees 
may be hindered by a free rider problem. In either c a s e ,  the 
value of the rights nl.ust diminish for the federal government, 
l i c e.nsee, or both. 
The question of product identily is of obvious ilr.po rtance. 
In some contracts, we may find that one of the parties has explicitly 
relinquished claim to the principal rights to incidental inventions 
developed under a federally sponsored R&D contract. Other R&D 
contracts, such as tho s e  of HE\V and A E C ,  contain provisions 
which award the rights to the government. Few, if any, government 
R&D contracts make no provisions for the disposi tion of rights. 
Debate on federal patent policy does not, however, revolve around 
what the patent provisions of contracts are, but rather what they 
should b e .  Much of the argument is generated by a lack of agree ment 
among the title policy and license policy advocates on product identity. 
Title policy advocates s e e  incidental inventions to a sponsored research 
contract as a product of the contract. The rights of the invention 
should therefore be the property of the government. If the contractor
is allo wed to retain the rights, the government is e s s e ntially giving 
a\vay an element of the public domain for monopolistic price exploitation 
- 32 -
of the public. The people not only pay 'the government to have the r e ­
search o n  the product p e rformed, but ai'so pay the monopoly p r i c e  ex-
48 . 1·  cl . tracted by the cont:ractor. License po lCY a vacates v1ew 
inventions not explicitly called for in the provisions of the contract 
and e s s entially developed a s  by by-products of the particular approach 
used to produce the product explicitly identified as incidental to 
the contract. Rights to these inventions should be given to the con­
tractor. Hov • .-ever, m o s t  license policy advocates agree that the 
government is entitled to a nontransferrable, i r revocable, royalty­
free l i c e n s e .  I t  i s  this l i c e n s e ,  not the title, that the public pays 
f . 1· 49 o r  in rea ity. 
License policy advc1cates further argue that no invention 
d e veloped by a contractor is solely the r e sult of an R&D contract. 
The. company utilizes its own faciliti e s ,  p e r s onhel, and know - how 
in q.ddition to any contracted funds. Contractors are therefore 
entitled to at least an exclusive, i r r evocable license from the 
government to exploit the patent for comme rcial pUrpo s e s .  With 
the exception of being able to i ssue li censes,  a n  exclusive, irrevocable 
license from the government to exploit the patent for commercial 
purpo s e s .  With the exception of the power to issue licenses, an 
exclusive i r r evocable license is identical to a license policy (pro­
vided, of course, that the government refrains from instituting a 
royalty requirement). 
The d i s c u s s ion so far has concerned itself only with a 
ceteris paribus analysis of the disposition of patent rights to inventions 
developed under federally sponsored R & D .  The two schools of federal 
patent policy realize that changes in policy cause redistributions of 
wealth a s  those d i s c u s s ed above but also pre cipitate other effe cts, 
such a s  shifts i n  demand and supply for sponsored research, i n  the 
rates of technological innova.tion and the d i s s emination of technological 
knowledge, i n  the commercialization incentive, and in the economic 
concentration i n  industry. In the next five i s s u e s ,  we will exarrtine 
arguments that appear in the literature on each of these effe cts. It 
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is important to note that each i s s ue ,  as within the literature, i s  
exami.ned i n  a pa rtial analys i s ,  Interacti..,-e effects between i s s u e s  
are n o t  explicitly addre s s ed. This d o e s  not appear in practice 
as a major concern. Note that the burden of proof has gene rally 
fallen o n  the license policy advocate s .  Their strategy generally 
seems to be to demonstrate the adverse effects on each issue of 
a title policy. Title policy advocates tend only to counter license 
Policy arguments. By the structure of the debate, interactive 
effects between i s s u e s  tend to get lost. 
Issue 2: Sponsored Research - Supply and Demand 
Of neces sary concern to both schools of thoug ht are prices, 
in particular the price of the R&:D contract and the price to the public 
!Or comme r cialized incidental inventions, In Issue 1 we have already 
addre s se d  the question of the commercial price of an incidental 
invention, Both schools concur that the contractor under a license 
policy i s  able to extract a higher price for a commercialized invention. 
Patent policy may not only affect the price of conunercialized 
inventions to the public. We may a s s ume that patent policy also enters 
into the bid functions of all the potential contractors for the R&D. A 
shift i n  the patent policy may therefore be expected to cause a shift 
in the supply curve. Advocates for license policy place the greatest 
empha s i s  on this point. The primary a s s ertion here is that companies 
bid at a s ignificantly higher price to perform a given contract if the 
patent provisions do not allow them to capture the benefits of incide ntal 
inventions. 50 This diffe rence in contract price must be a s s umed 
by the publi c .  If the governrnent is not willing to pay the higher price, 
the contract w ill not be let. O r  a s sume that Company A would 
offer the lowest bid price for a given contract under a license policy. 
Also a s sume that only Company A has a high probability of developing 
and commercializing an incide ntal invention under this contract. It 
is conceivable that if the contract was nO\V offe red under a title 
policy, Company A would not receive it. This may be due to (1 ) 
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the subjecti�e expectation of the winning bid price (based on A ' s  
expectation of the conduct o f  all other bidders) i s  now too low for 
Company A to invest in a proposal and submit a bid, or (2) Company 
A1:s bid is simply not the lo\ve st. 51 W h a t-e ,l"e r  i n v e n t i o n
Company A might have developed i s  now lost to society. License 
policy advocates maintain that all things considered it i s  consistent 
with the public interest to pay the higher product price under a 
license policy. 
The succe s s  of this argurn:ent hinges on the demonstration 
of s i g nificant adve r s e  price effect on contract bids of title policy 
relative to license policy. TitJle advocates maintain that empirically 
it i s  not the case that vesting principal rights in the contractor increases 
52 
competition for government con.tracts . T h e y  i m p  1 i c i t l  y e x t e n d
this point to infer that if there i s  no increase i n  competition, it i s  
unlikely that bid price depends s i g nificantly upon contra ctual patent 
provisions. While the conclusion may be correct, the extension i s  
c;iuite likely wrong. From a reading o f  congress ional hearings, competition 
in the above s e n s e  seems to refer to numb e r  of bidders rather than 
a level of bid price. In high barrier industries ( s uch as aerospace) 
one. would not expect to observe a change i n  bidde rs, even when 
patent policy is a s ignificant argument of the bid price, if all the 
companies in that industry depended on government contracts for 
a substantial portion of their survival. The effect we would observe 
in this c a s e  is a jump in bid price for the contract. 
A better argument that bid price does not sig nificantly 
depend on patent policy is that t:he offer to vest patent rights in the 
contractor to unfo r e s e e n  incidental inventions is of only small 
positive value to the contractor. Many companies use federal 
R&D funds not to generate profit but to maintain large diverse 
scientific and ellgineering staffs they could not othe rwise affo rd. 5 3  
The kno .. v-how developed in federally sponsored research and 
development may then be transferred to other profit-making operal:ions 
of the firm. It ha.s also been argued that the most important value 
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of a federal contract to research and develop a product lies in the 
inherent advantage of the R & D  contractor is becoming the supply 
54 . contractor. The contractor may trade off p rofits at the R&D 
stage (say i n  o r d e r  to capture the contract) for expected profits at 
the supply stage. 
Other title policy advocates attempt to counter the charge 
that title policy adversely affects the research s upply curve b y  an 
argument based o n  the traditional motivation of the patent system. 
The cost-plus-fixed-fee research contract eliminates the needs of 
a monopoly grant to compensate for risks i n  R&D. Companies will 
take this into account when preparing their bid. .Therefore, a patent 
incentive is not needed and in fact is harmful. 55 "\Vhereas the first 
two counterarguments are solely o n  evidential grounds, this last 
i s  e c o nomic theoretic. It implicitly a s sumes that the only value 
of a patent to a firm is to compensate R&D risks. Many theoretical 
agruments (both economic and legal) reject this point by placing a 
value on the defensive property of patents. Clearly, a strictly 
legal theoretic analysis of this issue would' hinge on the acceptance 
or rejection of a defensive theory of patents. The failure of man.y 
legal theoretic analyses to recognize this consideration is illustrative 
of the lack of properly integrated legal and economic theory. 
Issue 3: Technoloo-ical Innovation under Sponsored Research
License policy advocates assert that title policy adversely 
affe cts the rate of te chnological innovation. Under a title policy, 
there is no extra payment to contractors for developing derivative 
inventions. �1o Z"eover, rewards to the contractor bear no relation 
to the quality of what he invents and, by definition, all re\var d s  
inherent i n  the ow,ne rship of the title accrue t o  t h e  government. 
In short, if the government demands more than a royalty -free, 
nonexclusive license, no incentive exists for a contractor to 
generate any work not related to the delivery of the product specified 
in the contract. 
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Some licer�se policy advocates go so far as to say that poorer 
quality technicians would be assigned to those projects operating 
under a title policy, lessening the chance of a breakthrot:gh and of 
developing inci.denit::.l inventions. 56 I:·: is the tempo rary competitive 
advantage of a patent monopol:r which encourages a firm to take the 
financial risk of investi.ng its 1noney and talents in R&D. All other 
things being equal, the firm would utilize its risk capital and best 
talents o n  license policy contracts over title policy contracts. The 
effect may extend to those firr:ns which also have profit-making 
projects in the private sector. 
Title polfcy advocate s respond o n  several diffe rent levels. 
On the legal theoretic side, p rivate employers and government 
contractors traditionally demand and obtain as a condition of 
employment the complete a s s ignment of rights to inventions made 
by e:r;nployees under firm sponsorship. By analogy, since a government 
contractor i s  an '1employee" of the government, the goverri.ment should 
be able to exercise similar options. Other advocates maintain that 
the issue iS irrelevant, since the government does not select con--
tractors on the basis of their a.bility to cre2.te d e rivative inventions 
but rather on the bid to delive r- spe cified products. On the economic 
theoretic side, some title policy advocates argue that the incentives 
of scientists and engineers to invent are in<lepe.ndent of the contra ctual 
provision agreed to by management. Federal patent policy would 
have no effect since the invento r s  themselves do not receive principal 
rights under either policy. Others have even suggested that under 
certain c i r cumstances, individual inventors working for private 
contractors on federally sponsored R&D projects would have an 
increased incentive to invent. Recall that when the government 
acquires the principal rights to an invention, royalty-free licenses 
are g e nerally available upon request. It'.would be possible for the 
individual inventor to leave the contracting firm and further develop, 
produce, and ma.rket the invention on his own license. Addi tionally, 
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the market value of the inventor may improve since other firms may 
obtain a license to hi;S invention, and the inventor may be hired for 
his 11know-how'1 without fear of a subsequent infringement suit. 5 7  
Is s ue 4 :  D i s sen1inati.on o f  Te chnological Knowledge 
The fourth issue of the controve rsy is the dissemination of 
Title te chnological knowledge produced under contracted research. 
policy is a s serted to � s s i s t  dissemination of knowledge, since 
government ownership of patents eliminates barriers of industrial 
58 
secrecy. Additionally, the gove rnment needs the principal rights 
to inventions to insure that the inventions are actually disclosed. 
Under license or irrevocable licenses granted by the government the 
indiffe rent contractor who does not apply for a patent loses for 
technology the information he has dev�loped and loses for the government 
5 9  
a license b y  which l t  may partially control the knowledge. 
License policy advocates counter by a s serting that the 
gove rnment does not require title to facilitate widespread a c c e s s  
to the n e w  technological knowledge. 1iVhen a contractor files for 
a patent, full disclosure of the new i.nvention i s  obtained and the 
government is free to disseminate the new knowledge as it choo s e s .  
Title in the gove rnment would give only the additional right to license 
.firms to p roduce a product from the knowledge (which is a point 
fundamentally different from that made by the title policy advocates 
on the i s s ue ) .  License policy advocates question the fundamental 
a s s umption that the government would actively attempt to facilitate 
d i s semination if it had the principal rights in the first place. 
60 
In the case of the indiffe rent contractor, nO additional 
incentives exist in a title policy over a license policy to disclose 
patentable knowledge. Some license policy advocates maintain that 
unless new incentives are created, neither license nor title policy 
will affect disclosure of this type of invention. In the first Z7 months 
o! NASA1 s  operation under a full disclosure rule regarding techno­
logical information, only Bl invention disclosures were reported
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i n  o v e r  one thousand resea rc:h contracts. Others a,rgue that it 
is title policy that adversely affe cts disclosure. Firms may conceal 
the development of incidental inventions when under a title policy 
to prevent them from becoming elements of the public domain. 62 
One author g o e s  so far as t o  say that the requirement of a royalty­
free irrevocable license to the government granted under a license 
policy made bad to fraudulent repre sentations that incidental 




firms may decide that unl e s s  they can receive all rights to incide ntal 
inventions, it is in their inte;t'est to keep (fraudulently) such inventions 
as trade secrets.
Issue 5 :  Comme rcialization <lf Inventions Developed Under Sponsored 
Research 
On this i s s ue ,  license policy advocates basically follo\v two 
lines of argument. First, gove rnment ownership of pri ncipal rights 
defeats the normal incentive for industry to comme rcialize patented 
inventions. A new invention will be commercialized only when firms 
are able to ban competition in order to receive initial investmenl:s. 
Since a title policy would make available nonexclusive licenses, the 
competition could not be banned and so minimal incentive for commer ­
cialization would exist. The effect \Vould b e  similar to that i f  no 
patent were issued. 64 License. policy or exclusive licenses,
on the other hand, allow the contractor to retain the principal rif>hts 
{while granting the government a license) and the traditional incentive 
65 
of the monopoly grant remains i n  effect. 
Second, under present legal institutions, the government 
neither needs nor can use more than a royalty-free license to an 
invention. The government it:self i s  not in the business of comme r ­
cializing inventions. Such co:mmercialization would have t o  b e  con­
tracted out to private industry. License policy advocates maintain that 
the cost to the public of comn1ercializing a n  invention by the latter 
means genei'all:Y f;ir exceeds the cost of allowing the original 
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contractor to hold the title, In the exceptional case where private 
risk capital is not available for commercializing an important invention, 
the government could induce the development of the invention through 
a publicly funded development contract. 
Title policy advocates answer the first line of argument by 
noting that the cost-plus -fixed-fee research contracts eliminate the 
need oI a monopoly grant to compensate for initial investment and 
66 
R&D risks. Additionally, high technology R&D contracts are 
generally let to the largest firms in high-concentration and high-barrier 
industries. These industries do not need the traditional ince ntive of a 
patent system to induce invention conunercialization. Commercialization 
would fO}lQW s imply from the governme nt1 s granting a nonexclusive 
license i n  title policy. 
New products constantly develop in fields with no patent 
protection. This seems the r e s ult primarily of the need to maintain 
the competitive stance with innovating competitors and to the natural 
advantage over competitors which the innovator wins. If there as a 
demand for a product, title ·policy advocates argue, the product 
will be commerci2.lized, patent or no patent. Also, w e  empirically 
observe that busine s s es take nonexclusive licenses from TVA, 
HE\V, and the Department of Agriculture. Examples of such licenses
are frozen orange juice concentrates, aerosol bombs, oral polio 
. d 1 ·1· 67 b . d vaccines, an many granu ar fert1 i z e r s .  H o w e v e r ,  H a r  r 1  g e
House found i n  a study of 2, 024 contr·actor invention s ,  only 2 5 1  were 
used commercially. Of these, ZOO w e r e  utilized by industrial
contractors and 5 1  by licensees. Only 55 of the inventions played 
a critical role in the commercial products in which they were used. 
Defense contracts accounted for 1 9 8  of the inventio n s .  £3 The 
Harbridge House study further conclud e s  that once an invention 
is de v·eloped, the majo r  factor.s influencing its actual com­
mercialization are : ( 1 )  the extent of market demand for products
employing the invention (i.f any); (2) the degree of promotion by
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g-overnmeht agencies which sponsored the research; (3)  the size of 
the firm's investment necess.ary to bring it tb market; {4) the prior 
experience and attitude toward i.nnovations of the organization that 
developed them; and ( 5 )  the type of patent rights available to protect 
the firm1s invesbnent. 
Issue 6: E c onor�ic Concentration i n  Industry 
License policy advocates maintain that title policy favors 
big busine s s .  69 Title policies skew contracts to big business, s i.nce 
they can better afford the low profit margin and high risk of project 
t e rmination.
7 0  
This tends to limit entry of new firms. Larger firms 
also depend l e s s  than small firms on a subsequent supply contract 
for the production of the re sultant p r
.
oduct. The importance of this 
problem in the lliterature appears to have been treated solely as 
one.of e quity. Neither the degree of" the favo ritism nor i t s  effe cts 
have been examined in detail by license policy advocat e s .  In 
particular, the link between e conomic concentration and product 
commercialization potential is not examined. 
License policy advocates maintain that economic concentration 
problems , if any, may be adeq uately handled by traditional antitrust 
proceedings. 71 They further claim that the pos ition of the 
title policy advocates o n  this issue is therefore of little consequence. 
Nor does the absence of monopoly protection discourage entry af 
small firms. Large examples may be found in color film processing 
and the producticn of cards and equipment for computer cards. 
The Atomic Energy Commi ssion has always argued that 
title policy was necessary to prevent heavy concentration in the 
atomic energy field. Since much of the AEC 1 s  early prog rammatic 
R&D was conducted by a smalll number of contractors, it was feared 
that if the contractors w e r e  allowed rights, after a short period of 
time it would be impo s sible for a small firm to enter. 
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Another line of argument posed by some researchers is that 
the issue i s  mute, since the patents them selves have little o r  no 
commercial value. Support for the ir argument was first provided 
by an examination of patents owned by DOD contractors. I�ater a 
general examination concluded with s imilar ·results. 72 The I-Ia rbr-idge 
House study found that sales of inventions \Ve r e  heavily concentrated 
in a few patents. Over 88o/o of the contractor sales where the invento r s
played a critical role were attributable t o  five patents (out of 200 
c orrunerc ially utilized contractor inventions ) .  It was also found to be 
the case that the value of licenses was concentrated in a few patent s .  73 
IV CONCLUSION 
Over the years, as this literature review shows, the advocates 
of one type of patent policy or another have all dealt with the kind of 
we�are questions raised, both in the opening of this paper and earlier, 
in the political arena, d11ring World War II. All thes e  questions 
the matter of equity, the effect on industrial concentration; the 
opportunitie s  of small busine s s ;  the commercialization of new products 
and processes; the pace of technological innovation -- remain live 
issues for federal patent policy. But the arguments advanced £!.£. and 
contra title and license policy have not diffe red significantly from 
those advanced back in World War II. More impo rtant, the arguments 
seem to amount to little more than assertions whose thrust correlates 
highly with the economic or bureaucratic interests of the groups 
espousing them. Given this sort of analytical disagreement. one would 
not expect to find much uniformity in the practical license versus title 
policies of federal agencies. Indeed, for the three most important 
R&D agencies - - DOD, AEC and NASA - - the policy choices adopted 
in the postwar era have been as diverse as the choices available. 
The Department of Defense retained a license policy approach. 
D e spite contractor pressure, the Department refused to modify the 
existing policy of taking a license for all gove rnmental, as opposed to 
only defense, purpo ses. For one thing, policy planne r s  in the military 
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worried that ii they agreed to let their contractors deny royalty -free 
licenses to other agencies of the gove rmnent, tho se other agencies 
might do the same to the armed services. For another, military 
planners also believed that it was not, for example, the Navy Depart­
ment which was funding R&D but the U . S .  government, and accordingly, 
the gove rnment as a whole ought as a matter of equity to receive the 
appropriate royalty··free license, The Department did define three 
situations in which the governrnent1 s taking title would be deemed 
appropriate, but in all of them th{� burden of proof rested on the goverrunent. 74 
policy. 
The Atomic Energy Commission adopted a thoroughgoing title 
Within the administration .. some of the key framers of the 
atomic energy act of 1946 wholehea rtedly agreed with the position of 
Kilgore and the Attorney General ' s  report insofar as the ownership 
of patents was concerned. They considered it especially appropriate 
to a�opt a title policy in the case of atomic energy. For one thing, 
the government had footed the vast majority of the cost to transform 
the scientific phenomenon of nuclear fission into a source of explosive 
power. For another, because nuclear energy seemed so special a case 
for postwar R&D policy, it seemed desirable that the government be 
re sponsible for the commercial as well as the military development 
in the field. 
Patent policy figured pron1.inently in the revision of the Atomic 
Energy Act in 1954. Under the terms of the statute, the AEC was given 
authority for a more flexible disposition of patents deriving from 
research which it sponsored. The contractor could obtain title unde r  
ce rtain circumstanc e s ,  e. g . , i f  the patents w e r e  for devices not 
related to atomic energy and if the contractor already occupied an 
established position in the field. :Moreover, the AEC was granted 
general authority to issue waivers of title. Waiver was normally 
exercised in the c a s e  of development contracts for devices or processes 
related to the production of fuel elements and fuel and core cartridge 
a s s emblie s .  However, in the case of all inventions directly related 
to atomic energy, the AEC took title and the contractor got nothing, 75 
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NASA ' s  patent policy fell between that of the AEC and DOD. 
When the National Aeronautics and Space Act was passed in 1958, a 
number of Cong ressmen feared that just a few inventions could place 
the fate of - - and the profits from - - the entire space effort in the hands 
of a few contracto r s .  Accordingly, the act stipulated a title policy for 
NASA R&D contracts , especially if the inventions were pertinent to 
the development ar..d operation of space vehicle s  or impo rtant to 
continued research in space flight. However, the NASA administrator 
was given the authority to Waive title if he deemed such waiver in the 
public interest. The waiver was generally to be exercised in two 
situations: first, if private ownership seemed likely to result in the 
speediest practical exploitation of the invention; second, if the contrac­
tor had sufficiently substantial equities to justify the retention of rights .  
A t  the outset, NASA claimed that contractors seemed reluctant 
to ac�ept NASA contracts because of its strict title policy, and it was 
said that those who were retained did not put forth maximum efforts. 
Considering itself at a disadvantage compared with the Department of 
Defense, NASA administrators called for legislative relief in th e  
direction o f  a licens e  policy. Despite Congres sional hearings into 
the issue, no modification of the law was passed. But what Congress 
refused to grant, NASA managed to obtain onit:s own hook. The agency 
administered the waiver regulation with considerable liberality, so 
much, in fact, that NASA contractors seemed generally pleased. 7 6  
N o  doubt in part because of the variations in patent practice, 
calls for some sort of uniform policy have continued . Both Presidents 
Kennedy and Nixon issued memoranda designed to create one; both seem 
so laced with hoophole s  a s  to nullify the achievement of uniformity. 
Like the individual agency policies themselves ,  the transformation of 
the memoranda into practice seems to have been shaped mainly by the 
interaction of the particular bureaucracy with its client contractor s .  
It has evidently not been shaped b y  rational and factual analysis o f  how 
different variaticns might affect the welfare output. The improvement 
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of federal patent policy - - in federal R&D contracts or otherwise 
thus seems to be freighted with considerable political difficulty. 
But, a s  we hope this review makes clear, it is also burdened 
by inadequate understanding of what role the patent system plays in the 
encouragement of :innovation, and also by inadequate asses sments: of 
the welfare effects of various manipulations of patent policy. As we 
have pointed out in Section III, the opportunities for such manipula­
tions are dive r s e  and numerous. They include adjustments in the 
specific property :rights of the grant, in the nature of inventions 
required for the award of a pa.tent, in the procurement of the grant, 
and in its enforcement. It would, however, be unwise to adopt any 
of the se manipulations without first exploring their effects, in both 
legal and economic terms. Otherwise, there will be no more 
rational and theoretical foundation for a reformed federal patent 
policy than there has been for the policy in federal R&D contracts. 
I .  
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